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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
The jurisdiction of this Court is proper under Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2 (3) (j). The
Second Judicial District Court in and for Davis County, State of Utah, issued an order on
December 8, 2000. This Court granted UDOT's petition for interlocutory appeal on March 19,
2001.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW ON CROSS APPEAL
Whether the District Court correctly decided, as a matter of law, that Utah Code Ann. §
72-5-105 did not require a formal order of abandonment when less than the fee was taken by
eminent domain when the use of the property for highway purposes was discontinued?
The interpretation of statues is a question of law for which this Court reviews for
correctness. Facer v. Allen. 958 P.2d 919, 921 (Utah 1998). The factual findings made by the
Court at the evidentiary hearing are not set aside unless they are against the clear weight of the
evidence. Western Kane County Special Service District No. 1 v. Jackson Cattle Company, 744
P.2d 1376 (Utah 1987).
STATEMENT OF FACTS ON CROSS APPEAL
1.

In 1936, The Utah State Road Commission (hereinafter referred to as "UDOT")

received from the estate of James S. Harvey a right-of-way deed as a result of a condemnation
action. (R. at 199.)
2.

The 1936 right-of-way deed took an easement for highway right-of-way purposes

in the following described property:
Right of way for highway know as F.A.Project No. 136-A across
the grantor's land in the SW 1/4 of SW 1/4 of Section 1, T. 3 N., R.
1 W., S. L. B. & M. Said right of way is a strip of land 100 ft.
wide, 50 ft. on each side of the center line and center line produced
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of the survey of said project, the boundaries of which are described
as follows:
Beginning at the intersection of the south section line of said
Section 1 and said center line of survey at Engineer's Station
26+83, which point is 441.0 ft. easterly along said south section
line from the SW corner of said Section 1; thence east along said
south section line 64.9 feet; thence N.24°43'E. 1156.5 feet, to the
southeasterly right of way line of present highway; thence
S.45°43'W., 524.0 feet, thence S.24°43'W. 687.5 feet; thence east,
54.9 feet, along said south section line to the point of beginning, as
shown on the official map of said project on file in the office of the
State Road Commission of Utah.
(Hereinafter referred to as the "1936 Right-Of-Way").
(R. at 199.)
3.

The stated purpose of the 1936 Right-Of-Way Deed was to grant a perpetual right-

of-way for highway purposes. (R. at 127, 199.)
4.

At the time, UDOT put the 1936 Right-Of-Way to use for highway purposes.

(R. at 199-00.)
5.

In or about 1951, UDOT brought a condemnation action in which UDOT sought

to acquire two (2) parcels of property from Harvey's predecessor in title, designated by UDOT as
Parcel Nos. 32 and 32:A. (R. at 200.)
6.

The majority of Parcel Nos. 32 and 32: A were located within the boundaries of

the 1936 Right-Of-Way and abutted the centerline on the east side of the 1936 Right-Of-Way.
(R. at 200.)
7.

In or about 1951, UDOT received from Harvey's predecessor in title a warranty

deed transferring fee simple title to UDOT for the property covered by Parcel Nos. 32 and 32:A.
The property not within Parcel Nos. 32 and 32:A, but located within the 1936 Right-Of-Way and
east of the center line, is hereinafter referred to as "the Balance of the 1936 Right-Of-Way."
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(R. at 200.)
8.

In or about 1951, UDOT also brought a condemnation action against the adjoining

property owner to the west, Doritt Harvey Brough, in which UDOT sought to acquire two parcels
of property, designated by UDOT as Parcel Nos. 33 and 33:W. (R. at 200.)
9.

The majority of Parcel No. 33 :W and a significant portion of Parcel No. 33 were

located within the boundaries of the 1936 Right-Of-Way and abutted the center line on the west
side of the 1936 Right-Of-Way. (R. at 200.)
10.

In or about 1967, a final Order of Condemnation was entered granting UDOT fee

simple interest to the property covered by Parcel Nos. 33 and 33:W. (R. at 200.)
11.

In or about 1951, UDOT erected a fence which prevented the use of the Balance

of the 1936 Right-Of-Way for highway purposes. (R. at 200.)
12.

The majority of Parcel Nos. 32: A and 33 :W are located on the east side of and

within the fence erected by UDOT in or about 1951. (R. at 201.)
13.

In addition, UDOT at this same time obliterated and removed the highway located

within the Balance of the 1936 Right-Of-Way. (R. at 201.)
14.

At that time, UDOT abandoned use of the Balance of the 1936 Right-Of-Way for

highway purposes. (R. at 201.)
15.

UDOT did not take any formal action to vacate, abandon or to quit claim the 1936

Right-Of-Way, or any portion of it, adjoining the Harvey Real Estate's property to Harvey or
Harvey's predecessors in interest. (R. at 201.)
16.

On or about December 31,1992, Harvey Real Estate obtained a deed to its

property. The deed included the Balance of the 1936 Right-Of-Way, up to the centerline of the
1936 Right-Of-Way, and was obtained from Ray B. Harvey and Ima W. Harvey. (R. at 201.)
3

17.

Harvey's 1992 Deed includes the property east of, and abutting, Parcel Nos. 32,

32:A and the centerline of the 1936 Right-Of-Way. (R. at 201.)
18.

The Balance of the 1936 Right-Of-Way has not been used by UDOT or by any

other entity for highway purposes since 1951. (R. at 201.)
19.

Since 1951, Harvey or Harvey's predecessors in title have used the Balance of the

1936 Right-Of-Way for grazing and other agricultural purposes. (R. at 201.)
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS ON CROSS APPEAL
The 1936 property reverted to Harvey Real Estate when UDOT discontinued use of the
property for highway purposes. Utah law provides that when less than a fee interest is taken by
eminent domain, the lesser interest reverts to the fee owner when the stated use is abandoned.
None of the cases or statutes cited by UDOT are applicable to the instant circumstance where
only a right-of-way/easement was obtained through condemnation. When only an easement has
been acquired for the public use by condemnation, the easement expires when the use is
abandoned and the owner of the fee holds the land free from encumbrance.
ARGUMENT
I.
UDOT MISCONSTRUES THE ARGUMENT OF HARVEY REAL ESTATE
AND THE CASE LAW UPON WHICH UDOT RELIES.

UDOT improperly attempts to recast Harvey Real Estate's arguments as those seeking
damages for non-compensable injuries, instead of damages for compensable injuries. Harvey Real
Estate is not seeking damages for consequential injuries incurred by the public generally, but is
seeking damages for devaluation of its property as a result of loss of access and the suffering of
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peculiar and particular injuries. In addition, the cases upon which UDOT relies are distinguishable
from the present case and are not controlling.
A.

Harvey Real Estate is not Seeking Damages for Consequential Injuries.

In this case, Harvey Real Estate is not attempting to seek damages for a consequential injury
which is suffered by the public generally. Instead, the damage inflicted on the Harvey Real Estate
Property is similar to the damage inflicted on the property in Utah State Road Comm'n v Miva, 526
P.2d 926 (Utah 1974), and is peculiar and particular as in Three D Corp. v. Salt Lake City, 752 P.2d
1321 (Utah 1988). As a direct result of the highway construction, as in Miya, the Harvey Real Estate
Property will lose substantial market value due to a significant change in its highest and best use.
This injury also is peculiar and substantial to Harvey Real Estate.
The Harvey Real Estate property, uniquely situated at the intersection of Highway 89 and the
Old Mountain Road is suffering damages which are not shared by the public generally. Harvey Real
Estate's property is particularly and peculiarly injured by UDOT's construction for several reasons.
First, the Harvey Real Estate Property is in a unique location directly abutting the intersection of
Highway 89 and Old Mountain Road, which is the intersection being closed. (R. at 546,545). There
is only one other property which directly abuts the intersection, but as set forth below, it cannot be
developed commercially. Second, the Harvey Real Estate Property is particularly suitable for
commercial development in the "before" condition. There is no other property abutting the Highway
89/Old Mountain Road intersection which can be developed commercially. (R. at 547). All other
properties in the vicinity are residential. Third, the Harvey Real Estate Property will suffer loss of
visibility as a result of the reconstructed Highway 89 being built 20 to 25 feet below grade. (R. at
557, p.33). Finally, UDOT is taking part of Harvey Real Estate's property for construction of the
redesigned Highway 89, which includes construction of the frontage road. (R. at 38,44,46, 545 and
5

553). ] None of the members of the public generally, and which are in the vicinity of the Highway
89/Old Mountain Road intersection, are similarly situated to Harvey Real Estate.
Harvey Real Estate's experts, if permitted to do so, will testify that UDOT's project will
render the Harvey Real Estate property no longer capable of being developed commercially in the
"after" condition. (R. at 436,457). The Harvey Real Estate experts will also testify the highest and
best use of the Harvey Real Estate property will be greatly down-graded from commercial to
residential, causing substantial diminution in value to the Harvey Real Estate property. (R. at id.).
A potential buyer would not pay the same price for the Harvey Real Estate property in the "after"
condition as it would in the "before" condition. (R. at id).
In Utah State Road Comm'n v. Miya, 526 P.2d 926 (Utah 1974), the Utah Supreme Court
specifically allowed the landowner to make a claim for severance damages as a result of the
construction of the public improvements in the existing highway right-of-way. The construction of
the public improvement in the existing right-of-way was not being constructed "on the part taken."
In Miya, UDOT took a .66 acre portion of the landowner's 44 acres for the purpose of constructing
a frontage road. In addition, UDOT constructed a viaduct, with a maximum height of 25 feet, in the
existing state right-of-way. Id. at 928. Although noting that the property owner has no property right
to a free and unrestricted flow of traffic past his premises, the Miya Court noted:
where a police power is exercised as an incidental result of the exercise of eminent
domain, just compensation is due if the market value of the property has been
diminished. The constitutional guarantee of just compensation for the taking or
damaging of private property for public use is in no way affected by the fact that the
expropriator is exercising the police power. The rights of access, light, and air are

x

In addition to the immediate access from the Highway 89/Old Mountain Road intersection,
Harvey Real Estate has a 33 foot access point on Highway 89 at the southern end of its property. That
access is being taken and closed as a result of the redesigned Highway 89. (R. at 546). UDOT, however,
claims that the direct access to Highway 89 is only 24 feet in width. (R. at |d.)
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easements appurtenant to the land of an abutting owner on a street; they constitute
property rights forming part of the owner's estate. These substantial property rights,
although subject to reasonable regulation, may not be taken away or impaired without
just compensation.
Id. at 928-29. (emphasis added) (footnoted omitted). The Miva Court further addressed the issue
of when damage is compensable for construction of a public project within an existing right-of-way
as follows:
Unless the structure violates some right appurtenant to the abutting property or
otherwise inflicts some special and peculiar injury the owner is not entitled to
compensation.
Id. at 929. See also Three D Corp. v. Salt Lake City. 752 P.2d 1321, 1324, 1326 (Utah Ct.
App.1988) (compensation is permitted if the injury the landowner sustains is direct, peculiar and
substantial).
In the present case, the Harvey Real Estate property has a direct diminishment of access
and is suffering a peculiar injury that the public in general will not suffer. There is no other
property which directly abuts the Highway 89/Old Mountain Road intersection and which is
capable of being developed commercially. Moreover, the Harvey Real Estate property is
suffering an actual taking by UDOT and is losing its direct and immediate access to Highway 89
as a result of the closure of the Highway 89/Old Mountain Road intersection. The Harvey Real
Estate property also will suffer a substantial decrease in value as a result of the Highway 89/Old
Mountain Road intersection closure which other members of the public will not experience.
Harvey Real Estate is entitled to compensation because the injury it is sustaining is "direct,
peculiar and substantial." Three D Corp., 752 P.2d at 1326. Accordingly, this Court should
reverse the ruling of the trial court and permit Harvey Real Estate to introduce evidence at trial
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that the value of its remaining property has been diminished as a result of the UDOT
construction project, including the closure of the Highway 89/Old Mountain Road intersection.
B.

The Cases Upon Which UDOT Relies are Distinguishable and are Not
Controlling in this Case.

The cases relied upon by UDOT are distinguishable and should not control the Court's
decision in this case. Rather, close examination of the cases cited by UDOT establishes Harvey
Real Estate's right to claim compensation for severance damages caused by the Highway 89
reconstruction project, including the closure of the Highway 89/Old Mountain Road
intersection.
In Bailey Service & Supply Corp. v. State Road Comm'n, 533 P.2d 882 (Utah 1975),
UDOT built a viaduct which interfered with the ability of large trucks to access the property at
issue. In Bailey there was no taking of Bailey's property, nor did the construction of the viaduct
result in a loss or interference with access to the street. Id, at 833. The actual injury caused by
the construction of the viaduct was not a loss of access to the street causing a decrease in value
to Bailey's actual property, but rather an injury to the business and convenient access to that
business, due to the fact that large trucks were unable to access the property following the
construction of the viaduct. IcL See also Weber Basin Water Conservancy Dist. v. Hislop, 362
P.2d 580, 581 (Utah 1961) ("The law does not give [a property owner] a vested right in the
business which travel along a public highway may have afforded them"). It is evident that
Bailey was not a case like the present matter, as there was no taking, nor did Bailey seek
damages for the decrease in market value of the property itself, but damages to its business. The
Utah Supreme Court, accordingly, did not find the injury in Bailey to be compensable. Bailey,
533P.2dat883.
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In Springville Banking Co. v. Burton. 349 P.2d 157, 158 (Utah 1960), UDOT placed a
median on Main Street in Springville that made it difficult for southbound traffic to access the
property of Springville Banking Co. Although direct access to Springville Banking's property
was interfered with, UDOT did not exercise their power of eminent domain - no portion of
Springville Banking's property was taken. Id The decision of UDOT to construct a median
was done pursuant to an exercise of the police power, without any exercise of the power of
eminent domain. Id. Springville Banking's property was still reasonably accessible, and further
the nature of Springville's claim was for damages resulting from the ease with which customers
could access the property and possible loss in business, not devaluation to the land. Id. at 15859. See also State v. Rozelle. 120 P.2d 276 (Utah 1941) (loss of business when the Road
Commission rerouted the highway, bypassing Rozzelle's property, was non-compensable);
Weber Basin, 362 P.2d at 581 ("The law does not give [a property owner] a vested right in the
business which travel along a public highway may have afforded them."). As these business
damages were not compensable property rights, the Utah Supreme Court held that Springville
Banking was not entitled to compensation. Id at 159. Moreover, Springville Banking was not
claiming a peculiar injury not shared by the public generally. But in the case at hand, Harvey
Real Estate is seeking compensation for devaluation of the land itself, not loss of business and is
claiming a peculiar injury.
In State Road Comm'n v. Utah Sugar Co.. 448 P.2d 901 (Utah 1968), the Utah Sugar
Company was not seeking damages for loss of access to the Highway, as Harvey is in the
present case, nor was Utah Sugar seeking the loss in value to its property. Utah Sugar was
seeking compensation for increased business expenses resulting from having to use a more
circuitous route, an injury which the Utah Supreme Court found to be non-compensable. Id. at
9

902. Moreover, the damages which Utah Sugar Co. was seeking were trivial in relation to the
value of the property. Utah Sugar estimated their increased business cost to be approximately
$350 per year, in relation to a million dollar property. "Assuming, arguendo, that the $3,500
expense for canal riders was a legitimate item of severance damages, it is inconceivable to this
writer that a willing buyer and a willing seller would quibble over such minutiae in the purchase
and sale of a million dollar facility." Id. at 904.
In State Road Commission v Rozelle, 120 P.2d 276 (Utah 1941), the landowner was
seeking compensation for loss of business, not devaluation to its property. As the Court noted,
u

[t]he controversy in this case arises over the question of whether or not, in ascertaining the

value of condemnee's remaining land after the part condemned has been taken, loss of business
is a proper element for consideration." Id. at 465. However, Harvey Real Estate is not seeking
any compensation for loss of business as did the landowner in Rozelle, but is seeking
compensation for a decrease in the value of its land.
In UDOT v D'Ambrosio, 743 P.2d 1220 (Utah 1987), the trial court refused to permit
evidence of certain damages, ruling that the damages sought were consequential in nature. The
Utah Supreme Court noted that "[the general rule is that damages attributable to the taking of
others' property and the construction of improvements thereon are not compensable." Id. at
1221. (emphasis added). Those damages suffered generally by the public are deemed
consequential and, thus, not compensable. Id. at 1221-22. The landowner in D'Ambrosio
sought damages due to the construction of the highway and its "proximity" to their residential
property, but the Court found that those damages were no different in nature from the damages
suffered by all other property owners in the area whose property was not taken. Id. at 1222. In
the case at hand, however, the damages sought are peculiar in nature, the Harvey Real Estate
10

property directly abuts the closed intersection and the damages are not the same as suffered by
all other property owners in the area. The Harvey Real Estate property will be significantly
devalued. Moreover, the Harvey Real Estate Property was actually taken by UDOT for
construction of the frontage road, which allowed closure of the Highway 89/Old Mountain Road
Intersection.
In Utah Road Comm'n v. Hansen, 383 P.2d 917, 918 (Utah 1963), UDOT took a portion
of Hansen's property on which an auto wrecking business existed. The portion of the property
taken contained an access road to 21 st South. The Hansen's sought severance damages for the
decrease in the value of their remaining property because of the loss of access to 21 st South. IcL
Because the access road was part of the Hansen's property which was taken, the landowner was
compensated for the "worth of the access that land had to the highway." Id. at 920. The
landowners attempt to seek severance damages for the loss of access to 21st South was an
attempt to obtain double recovery, as they had been compensated for the value of the access
when paid for the value of the property taken by UDOT. Id. A double recovery plainly was
not permitted. Whereas in the present case Harvey Real Estate is not attempting to seek double
recovery for its injuries.
In Three D Corp. v. Salt Lake City. 752 P.2d 1321, 1322 (Utah Ct. App. 1988), Three D
was compensated for loss of parking when the city constructed a curb and sidewalk in an effort
to improve 1300 South, even though there had been no taking of their property. The Utah Court
of Appeals permitted the landowner to receive this compensation in the absence of any actual
take. The Utah Court of Appeals also noted that Three D would suffer a peculiar injury, as
opposed to consequential injuries suffered by the public generally. Id at 1326. Surely, if such

11

relief is permitted in Three D Corp. where there is no actual taking, the peculiar injury suffered
by Harvey Real Estate should be compensated in the presence of an actual take.
Closer examination of the cases relied upon by UDOT shows they are distinguishable
from the present case. Harvey Real Estate is losing an appurtenant right to its property as was
the landowner in Miya. Just as the landowner was permitted to seek severance damages for the
construction of the project in the existing state right-of-way, Harvey Real Estate should
similarly be permitted to seek severance damages for the construction of the Highway 89 project
in the existing right-of-way and which directly abuts its property. In addition, because Harvey
Real Estate has suffered a peculiar injury, different from the public in general, and the damages
which Harvey Real Estate is suffering are substantial, Harvey Real Estate should be permitted to
introduce that evidence at trial for determination by the jury. Therefore, the ruling of the lower
court should be reversed and this matter should be remanded to permit Harvey Real Estate to
present evidence at trial of the decrease in the value of its property as a result of the Highway 89
reconstruction project, including the closure of the Highway 89/Old Mountain Road
intersection.
C.

UDOT Cannot Accomplish Piecemeal That Would be Unconstitutional if
Done at the Same Time.

UDOT is also misguided in its argument that because it was within its police power to
close the Highway 89/Old Mountain Road intersection without taking any of Harvey Real
Estate's property, it could have done so without violating any of Harvey Real Estate's
constitutional rights. See Brief of Appellee, p. 22. The logical extension would be that UDOT
could subsequently condemn part of Harvey Real Estate's Property to then construct the
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frontage road at a later date. However, that "piecemeal" argument was soundly rejected by the
Utah Court of Appeals in Three D Corp. v Salt Lake City, 752 P.2d 1321 (Utah 1988).
In Three D Corp., the defendant asserted that the appearance of certain aspects of the
public project were apparently one of unfinished work. Salt Lake City also acknowledged that if
it had condemned property from the landowner and affected a physical take, it would have then
been required to pay the severance damages sought by the landowner. Id at 1323. The
landowner asserted that these two factors suggested that the City embarked upon a scheme to do
in two steps what it could not do in one. The landowner was concerned that the City would later
condemn a strip of land to complete the sidewalk, but then claim that it owes only for the value
of the strip since the loss of parking occurred long ago and was not the result of the
condemnation. The City correctly observed that such a concern is entirely speculative, but also
suggested it was mindful of the lack of warmth which such a scheme would likely be received
judicially. "As Justice Homes aptly noted more than 50 years ago, 'a strong public desire to
improve the public condition is not enough to warrant achieving the desire by a shorter cut than
the constitutional way of paying for the change.'" Id. (quoting First English Evangelistic
Lutheran Church v Los Angeles. 482 U.S. 304, 107 S. Ct. 2378, 2389 (1987)).
Because UDOT could not do in one step, what in essence it claims it could do in two
steps, that does not relieve UDOT of its constitutional obligation to pay just compensation for
the taking of the Harvey Real Estate Property, which includes severance damages. Moreover,
UDOT is not attempting to complete this project in two steps, but has done it in one step. What
UDOT may have chosen to do is irrelevant and speculative. What matters is that UDOT has
taken the Harvey Real Estate Property for the construction of the frontage road, which has
allowed the closure of the Highway 89/Old Mountain Road intersection. Accordingly, this
13

Court should permit Harvey Real Estate to seek compensation for the substantial devaluation of
its property as a result of the construction of the frontage road on the Harvey Real Estate
Property and the resulting closure of the Highway 89/Old Mountain Road intersection.
II.
THE 1936 PROPERTY BELONGS TO HARVEY.
The 1936 Property does not belong to UDOT, but rather it reverted to Harvey
whe 1 UDOT discontinued use of the property. The case law appears to be uniform that if less
than i fee interest is taken, such as an easement/right-of-way, the property automatically reverts
to the o vner upon the discontinuance of the stated purpose. In this case, the stated purpose of
the 1936 light-of-Way Deed was to take a right-of-way for highway purposes. 'The purpose of
this deed L to grant a perpetual right of way for highway purposes." (R. at 127: Def.'s Trial Ex.
2. See R. at 99.) The stated purpose discontinued in 1946 and has not been used by UDOT
since that time
In Olser v. Board of Education, 571 P.2d 1336 (Utah 1977), the Utah Supreme Court
was presented wii I the issue of whether land acquired by the Granite School Board reverted to
the previous owner when the land was no longer used as a school. Although the Court held that
the property did not i *vert, it was because fee title to the property was acquired, not an
easement/right-of-wa)

Id. at 1339. "Where the fee is vested the property does not revert to its

former owner when it ct ises to be used for the purpose for which it was condemned." Id.
(citing 30 C.J.S., Eminent Domain, § 460) (emphasis added). See also Tuttle v. Sowadzki, 126
P. 959, 963 (Utah 1912) ("' he moment the public easement ceased to exist by reason of its
abandonment, [the former ov ler] took the title free from all such incumbrances."). Since the
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Utah Supreme Court distinguished fee title from other ownership interests, it follows that with
other ownership interests the property does revert upon discontinuance of use.
In the instant case, since the fee interest was not vested in UDOT, the lesser interest
reverted when the stated use was abandoned. Hence, the statues cited by UDOT - which
predate the Olsen decision by a half century - are inapplicable to Harvey's property because no
fee interest was ever vested. Section 72-5-105, and it predecessors, does not apply where less
than a fee was acquired by eminent domain for a stated purpose..
Moreover, the Corpus Juris Secundum, which was cited with approval and for support
by the Utah Supreme Court in Olsen, states that property reverts to the former owner upon the
discontinuance of the easement/right-of-way.
An easement acquired by condemnation ceases when the public use ceases. So,
where . . . the public use ceases, the owner of the fee has the right to recover the
property or to re-enter and to use it just as though it had never been condemned,
possession and all other incidents of dominion and ownership reverting to him.
29A C.J.S., Eminent Domain, § 425 (emphasis added) (cited by Olsen v. Board of Education,
571 P.2d 1336, 1339 (Utah 1977)). None of the statutes cited by UDOT relate to the
abandonment of an easement.
Nichols on Eminent Domain also supports Harvey Real Estate's position. "[I]f the
public use is subsequently discontinued or abandoned, the public easement is extinguished, and
the possession of the land reverts to the owner of the fee free from any rights in the public."
Nichols on Eminent Domain, § 9.07[7][c] (citing Tuttle v. Sowadzki, 126 P. 959 (Utah 1912)).
American Jurisprudence, Second Edition, also states that "[w]hen only an easement has been
acquired for the public use by condemnation, if the use for which the land was taken is formally
discontinued, permanently abandoned in fact, or becomes impossible, or the land is devoted to a
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different and inconsistent use, the easement expires and the owner of the fee holds the land free
from encumbrance." Am. Jur. 2d, Eminent Domain, § 939.
Courts of other jurisdictions similarly, and apparently uniformly, hold that if only an
easement is taken, and the use then is discontinued or abandoned, the property reverts to the
former owner.
[W]hen an easement is taken as a public highway, the soil and freehold remain in
the owner of the land encumbered only with the right of passage in the public;
and upon a discontinuance of the highway, the soil and feehold revert to the
owner, and in the case of streets and alleys, the proprietors of adjacent lots own
the soil to the middle of the street, subject only to this right of passage in the
public; and upon a discontinuance of such street or alley, the adjacent owners of
lots on each side take the soil to the middle of the street.
Puget Sound Alumni v. The City of Seattle, 422 P.2d 799, 802 (Wash. 1967) (quoting
Burmeister v. Howard, 1 Wash. Terr. 207, 211 (1867)) (emphasis added). See Rogers v. City of
Knoxville, 289 S.W.2d 868, 873 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1955) (stating that the generally accepted rule
is that where a right-of-way is condemned it reverts upon nonuser to the owner of the fee);
Board of Education v. Vic Regnier Builders, 648 P.2d 1143, 1146-47 (Kan. 1982) (same); Islev
v. Bogart, 338 F.2d 33, 35 (10th Cir. 1964) (same); McKinlev v. Waterloo R.R. Co., 368 N.W.2d
131, 133-34 (Iowa 1985) (same); Bear Creek Dev. Corp. v. The Genesee Foundation, 919 P.2d
948, 955 (Colo. Ct. App. 1996) (same).
In the present case, the 1936 Right-of-Way Deed granted in that condemnation action
transferred only a right-of-way, not fee title. "The purpose of this deed is to grant a perpetual
right of way for highway purposes." (R. at 199) (emphasis added). At no time did Harvey ever
transfer a fee interest in the 1936 Property to UDOT. In 1946, UDOT discontinued using the
1936 Property as a highway and has not used that property for over 50 years. Mr. Jack DeMass,
a surveyor, testified in a hearing before the trial court that the right of way fence erected by
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UDOT was used not only to keep livestock in, but also to prevent the public from using the
1936 Right-of-Way and to prevent its use as a highway. (R. at 390-91, 565.)
UDOT's own witnesses and its prior condemnation maps also demonstrate that the road
lying on the 1936 Right-of-Way was to be obliterated and not used as a highway. (R. at 390-91,
565.) The testimony of Richard Harvey is that since at least 1950, when the road lying on the
1936 Right-of-Way was obliterated, UDOT has not used the 1936 Right-of-Way for highway
purposes. (R. at 565.) The 1936 Property has been used as a grazing pasture by Harvey and has
been fenced off from public use. (R. at 565.) Accordingly, when UDOT discontinued using the
1936 Property for highway purposes in 1946, the property reverted to Harvey.
Furthermore, UDOT has admitted and acknowledged that Harvey owned the 1936
Property in prior proceedings. In the 1951 and 1967 condemnation actions, UDOT acquired by
eminent domain property which lay within the boundaries of the property described in the 1936
Right-of-Way Deed. At this same time, UDOT also acquired property within the boundaries of
the 1936 Property from an adjoining landowner. It would be ludicrous for UDOT to now assert
that it acquired four separate parcels of property in 1951 and 1967 when it really did not need to
because it already owned the property. The only reason UDOT had to acquire these properties is
because it did not own the property. UDOT would not have condemned land it already owned.
UDOT should not now be heard to say that it owns the 1936 Property. Accordingly, this Court
should find that Harvey owns the 1936 Property, free and clear of UDOT's claims and affirm
the decision of the lower Court..
The Balance of the 1936 Right-of-Way automatically reverted to Harvey when the use
for highway purposes was discontinued. Moreover, the cases cited by UDOT are not persuasive
in this action. The Western Kane County case is distinguishable from the present situation in
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that the case involved the doctrine of equitable estoppel and did not involve property which had
been acquired by the government through the power of eminent domain. The legal principle set
forth by Harvey is that if less than the fee is acquired by the power of eminent domain, it
automatically reverts to the fee property owner upon discontinuance of use. UDOT has not
provided any authority to contradict that principle and that was not the situation or holding in
the Western Kane County case.
Likewise, the case of Kohler v. Martiru 916 P.2d 910 (Utah App. 1996) is unhelpful to
the Court's analysis. In Kohler, landowners brought an action against adjoining landowners
claiming they owned an easement to a driveway leading to their property. Both the trial court
and the appellate court found that a public thoroughfare had been created through use by the
general public. After determining a public thoroughfare existed, the Court rejected the
landowner's right to a prescriptive easement because such landowner's use was in common with
the public generally, Thus, Kohler is distinguishable from the case at hand because there was no
easement to be abandoned.
The facts of the instant case are also distinguishable from Henderson v. Osguthorpe, 657
P.2d 1268 (Utah 1982) and Ercanbrack v. Judd, 524 P.2d 595 (Utah 1974), cases where counties
were involved and adherence to strict county procedural requirements were not followed. In
Henderson, the county obtained a complete fee interest in property to be developed as a road
through the recordation of an approved subdivision plan. Since it is undisputed that UDOT
never obtained a fee interest in this matter. Henderson is clearly not applicable to the facts at
hand.
In Ercanbrack, a sheep owner sued an abutting landowner for the loss of his snowbound
sheep after the abutting landowner locked a gate to an arguably public road. The appellate court
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affirmed the trial court's ruling that the county commissioners did not follow the proper
procedure for closing a public road that had been established by use, and not by grant.
Ercanbrack is distinguishable from the case at hand on several accounts: First, the 1936 rightof-way was established by grant - not by use; second, the road in Ercanbrack was still in use
whereas the 1936 right-of-way has not been used for over 50 years; and third, Harvey has not
constructed a barrier to a previously existing roadway.
Lastly, Provo City v. Denver & Rio Grande Western Railroad Co., 156 F.2d 710 (10th
Cir. 1946) is also distinguished because the issue was whether the doctrine of equitable estoppel
could be evoked where a city attempted to vacate a public street without enacting the required
ordinance. The appellate Court reversed the trial court after concluding that the railroad
company improperly barricaded a public street with knowledge that no ordinance had been
passed. Again, this case has no bearing on the instant facts where UDOT abandoned an
easement over 50 years ago. Accordingly, UDOT lost its easement/right-of-way in Harvey's
property when discontinued use of the 1936 right-of-way for highway purposes. This Court,
therefore, should affirm the ruling of the lower Court.
CONCLUSION
Harvey Real Estate should be permitted to introduce at trial evidence of severance
damages resulting from the closure of the Highway 89/Old Mountain Road intersection. Not
only is Harvey Real Estate losing an appurtenant right, but is suffering a peculiar and substantial
damage that members of the general public will not suffer. Accordingly, this Court should
reverse the ruling of the trial court and allowed this evidence to be presented to the jury.
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The 1936 right of way automatically reverted to Harvey Real Estate upon the
discontinuance of its use for highway purposes. The authority relied upon by UDOT is
inapplicable in that it does not address the situation of when less than fee title is taken by the
power of eminent domain and the stated purpose for the property has discontinued. This Court,
therefore, should uphold the trial court's ruling awarding the 1936 property to Harvey Real
Estate.
DATED this

of December, 2001.
RRY ANDERSON & MANSFIELD

Robert E. Mansfield
\
Todd D. Weiler \
Attorneys for Ddfenjdant Appellant
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ROBERT E. MANSFIELD (#6272)
PARRY ANDERSON & MANSFIELD
1270 Eagle Gate Tower
60 East South Temple
Salt Lake City, Utah 8<J' "
Telephone: (801)

CIFF

:0JRT

Attorneys for Defendant

IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COUR" !\' W D FOR
r»A \ / T <

UTAH DEPARTMENT OF
TRANSPORTATION
Planum,

FINDING'S OI i At 1 AM)
CONCLUSIONS oi i \w

v.
HARVEY REAL FS i
Partnership,

Case No. 1)8070031 i(:D,V^(C^

Limited

Judge Michael G. Allphin
Defendants

The hearing on the ownership of disputed property in this matter came on f -•
before the above-entitk\

•:

!

er i i , 1999, beginning at the .-.^w o\

8:00 a.m. Plaintiff was represented by its counsel, Steven F. Alder, and Defendant was
represented'"v it« counse,
!'

K....I.

;

, :..: taken evidence by way of exhibit and testimony, and having heard

the arguments of counsel, makes the following i i;^!.- J^ :

:••

FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

In 1936, The Utah State Road Commission (hereinafter referred to as "UDOT")

received from the estate of James S. Harvey a right-of-way deed as a result of a
condemnation action.
2.

The 1936 right-of-way deed took an easement for highway right-of-way

purposes in the following described property:
Right of way for highway know as F.A.Project No. 136-A across
the grantor's land in the SW 1/4 of SW 1/4 of Section 1, T. 3
N., R. 1 W., S. L. B. & M. Said right of way is a strip of land
100 ft. wide, 50 ft. on each side of the center line and center line
produced of the survey of said project, the boundaries of which
are described as follows:
Beginning at the intersection of the south section line of said
Section 1 and said center line of survey at Engineer's Station
26+83, which point is 441.0 ft. easterly along said south section
line from the SW corner of said Section 1; thence east along
said south section line 64.9 feet; thence N.24°43,E. 1156.5 feet,
to the southeasterly right of way line of present highway; thence
S.45°43'W., 524.0 feet, thence S.24°43'W. 687.5 feet; thence
east, 54.9 feet, along said south section line to the point of
beginning, as shown on the official map of said project on file in
the office of the State Road Commission of Utah.
(Hereinafter referred to as the "1936 Right-Of-Way").
3.
The stated purpose of the 1936 Right-Of-Way Deed was to grant a perpetual
right-of-way for highway purposes.
4.

At this time, UDOT put the 1936 Right-Of-Way to use for highway purposes.

2

0(H9i

5.

In or about }Q*

suiif-li" n« d\ tjii > is" i •

brougl it a coi iden u latioi i action in winch UDOT

*"Uweb> of property from Defendant's predecessor in title, designated

by UDOT as Parcel. Nos, 32 and 32:A.
6.

n

'•'•/el Nos. 32 and 32:A were located within the boundaries of

the 1936 Right-( )f-Wa\ and abutted the centerline on the east si t
I.

:

it-Of-Way.

eived from Defendant's predecessor in title a

warranty deed transferring fee simple title v UDOT for the property covered \u r.mrl N
32 and 32:A. The property not \ .

~:A, but located within the 1936

Kiglil Of Wnv .imi rust of the center line, is hereinafter referred to as ''the Balance of the
1936 Right-Of-Way."
8.

I

I I "' I "! "I )OT also brought a condemnation action against the

adjoining property owner to the west, Doritt Harvey Brough, in u : _
acquire two parcels of propcil^, dcMgnaU'il l^ l l POT as Parcel Nos. 33 and v<:W.
9.

The majority of Parcel 33:W and a significant portion of Parcel 3 i were

*%: vvitlrh: lie boundaries ot the I'MO RIJJJII Ot W;iv and .ihiftnl tfie center line on the
w<

Right-Of-Way.
v C.J—-r ^ T n final Order ,;; •. ..,;

fee simpL
II.
Balance of the

-anting UDOT

Parcel Nos. 33 and 33:W.
in or about !s)**

• . -* )| erected a fence which prevent i m, ns» tf ,lw

.

noses.

3
f! J J "
I' ' ? - i

12.

The majority of Parcel Nos. 32:A and 33:W are located on the east side of and

within the fence erected by UDOT in or about 1951.
13.

In addition, UDOT at this same time obliterated and dug up the highway

located within the Balance of the 1936 Right-Of-Way.
14.

At this time, UDOT abandoned use of the Balance of the 1936 Right-Of-Way

for highway purposes.
15.

UDOT did not take any formal action to vacate, abandon or to quit claim the

1936 Right-Of-Way, or any portion of it, adjoining the Defendant's property to the Defendant
or its predecessors in interest.
16.

On or about December 31, 1992, Defendant obtained its deed to its property,

which included the Balance of the 1936 Right-Of-Way, up to the centerline of the 1936
Right-Of-Way from Ray B. Harvey and Ima W. Harvey.
17.

The Defendant's Deed includes the property east of, and abutting, Parcel Nos.

32, 32:A and the centerline of the 1936 Right-Of-Way.
18.

The Balance of the 1936 Right-Of-Way has not been used by UDOT or used

by any other entity for highway purposes since 1951.
19.

Since 1951, Defendant or its predecessors in title have used the Balance of the

1936 Right-Of-Way for grazing and other agricultural purposes.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact, the Court makes the following
Conclusions of Law:
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1.

The 1936 Right-Of-Way Deed between the

State Road < "(»iniir-..vi i I 111,11 LI

\

^ and Uic

it pass fee title \o the State Road Commission, but,

rather, transferred onl\ an easement lor highway purposes.
2.

ommission abandoned all right to future use and

an ownership in uic balance **t the :LH6 Right-Of-Way and discontinued UMIIJJ • I• i• p,i»

,

for highway purposes.
3.

At that time, the Balance of 1936 Right-Of-Way automatically reverted to

Defendant or its predecessor in title.
,

4.

fiiii;iiil'\ predecessor in title transferred the property to Defendant,

which included the Balance of the 1936 Right-Of-Way.
5.
1

"" II piopeily iilrvi ii!|v J i

I

MKP Deed between Defendant and Ray and Ima

'."V", nini Defendant is the proper and legal property of Defendant as between

Defendant.
finds that there is no private right of action against the state based
on a theory of boundary by acquiescence.
I
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MI Nnvoniber, 1999.
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The Honorable Mic
Michael G/Aillphin
District Court Judge
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Steven R Alder
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